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1. Introduction  
 
“Payments for environmental services are not primarily a poverty reduction 
tool…Nevertheless, PES programmes have been shown to be potentially 
accessible and beneficial to the poor if properly designed.” 
(FAO, 2007, pp.10-11) 
 
Payments for Environmental Services (PES) are a means of creating a market 
in environmental/ecosystem services; they link those who value a given service with 
those who can provide it. By their nature, PES are not primarily intended as a tool for 
poverty alleviation but they may be tailored for this purpose.  This report focuses on 
PES schemes for watershed functions and why it is so difficult to make these schemes 
pro-rural poor. 
From the perspective of donors, such as the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD), the problem is that the rural poor lack the prerequisites for 
participation in PES: often, they do not have secure land tenure, rewards are easily 
usurped by the elite, and they lack the assets (human capital, natural capital, etc.) to 
provide the level of service needed to yield the desired impacts.   Part of the solution 
to this stubborn dilemma may be to eschew PES schemes that simply seek market 
creation, which we may call by-the-book PES, and rather than clinging to economic 
principles, develop a variant of PES that builds on the reality faced by the rural poor. 
This means allowing for market support, subsidies and means of directing PES 
benefits to the rural poor; in short, developing pro-rural-poor PES. 
To develop this argument, this report first provides an overview of 
environmental economics, market failure and water resources, out of which PES 
schemes have arisen, including a brief discussion of market creation.  This sets the 
stage for what PES might be, followed by an overview of issues raised in the actual 
operation of PES in Latin America, Africa and Asia.  The core of the report addresses 
the question of why it is so difficult for PES to be pro-poor and concludes with a case 
study of an IFAD-supported project in Kenya in which IFAD and its partners are 
pursuing pro-poor PES for rural poverty alleviation and environmental services.   
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2. The context 
PES schemes have become popular with donors over the last few years; most 
early initiatives were in Latin America, which remains the region with the most PES 
schemes, followed by Asia, and lastly Africa.  Yet in spite of their widespread 
application, there is scant evidence as to their effectiveness as tools for poverty 
reduction.  To understand why PES schemes seem to have largely failed the rural poor, 
it may help to understand the economic theory behind them. 
 
2.1 The economics of environmental services and market 
creation 
 Environmental services (or ecosystem services) provide essential benefits to 
society – see Figure 1.   
 
Figure 1: Products & Benefits Provided by Ecosystem Services 
Source: FAO (2007, p.5) after (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005)) 
 
Market failure and externalities lie at the heart of the PES concept.  Market 
failure occurs when the market fails to guide economic activities toward the social 
optimum1.  Externalities refer to actions of one agent affecting another’s - positively 
or negatively.  Two means of attempting to limit the negative externalities have been 
widely tried: command-and-control and market-based incentives (Stavins, 2002).  
                                                 
1 With regard to the environment and pollution, this is the point at which the polluter internalizes the 
costs of their pollution (i.e., where Marginal Net Private Benefit > Marginal External Cost). 
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 “PES schemes are an effort to ‘get the incentives right’ by sending 
accurate signals to both providers and users that reflect the real social, 
environmental and economic benefits that environmental services 
deliver… PES transactions refer to voluntary transactions where a service 
provider is paid by, or on behalf of, service beneficiaries for agricultural 
land, forest, coastal or marine management practices that are expected to 
result in continued or improved service.”  
(FAO, 2007, p.7) 
   
Market Creation is the market-based incentive ideally employed for PES.  It 
involves putting an economic value on environmental services and bringing together 
willing buyers and providers; examples include emissions trading, nutrient trading, 
wetland mitigation and PES.  Fundamental to PES and market creation is the 
economic valuation of ecosystem services. The Total Economic Valuation technique 
(Barbier et al., 1997, Barbier, 1989) categorizes the multiple uses of ecosystems from 
a societal point of view, assigns monetary value, and then sums the values of the 
various uses to arrive at a monetary value for the system in question.  This approach 
has been used to value ecosystems generally and within the context of valuation to 
support livelihoods based on ecosystem services (Mainka et al., 2005).  However, the 
economic valuation of ecosystem services is a contentious issue – not least because 
valuation is subjective in the absence of an established market. 
 
 
Figure 2: Total Economic Valuation Technique 
 
Total Economic 
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treatment) 
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Source: Adapted from Barbier (1989) 
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Market creation occurs when property rights for natural resources and their 
use are clearly defined and upheld by a strong authority, transaction costs are low, and 
there are enough buyers and sellers to foster regular trade. This is hard to achieve in 
the context of a PES scheme – see Figure 3.   
 
 
Figure 3: The Challenges of Reaching Market Creation in a PES Scheme 
Source: Porras (2007) 
 
There are various options for transferring payment from buyers to sellers: 
compensation schemes restrict payment to those who bear the opportunity costs (the 
costs of foregoing the next best option, e.g. cutting down a forest for timber); direct 
payment schemes, which often meet ideological resistance; and reward schemes 
which are, arguably, just payment schemes in different packaging but are often better 
received as a result (and can better serve the needs of recipients). 
 
2.2 The New Rurality and rural livelihoods 
The new rurality refers to the way the rural context is changing as people 
increasingly diversify their livelihood strategies beyond agriculture (Rauch, 2008).  
As more and more people migrate to cities and factories for work, the rural context is 
changed – witnessed by the feminization of agriculture and the increasing reliance of 
poor rural residents on non-farm income.  This is not to say that farm-income is no 
longer a significant component of rural income, it is.  But an increasing proportion of 
rural income comes from other sources; only in Africa does agriculture remains the 
main source of rural income (FAO, 2008).     
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In light of this new rurality, donors 2  need to reconsider their investment 
strategies to ensure that they remain pro-poor. When planning a PES scheme intended 
to benefit the rural poor, several assumptions need be tested against the new rurality: 
for instance, the likelihood that upstream land users will benefit from PES does not 
necessarily mean that there will be a substantial impact on poverty.  Across many 
watersheds a large proportion of the population may be poor but this will not be true 
everywhere; and the poorest of the poor may not be the ones who receive the 
payments. Context is everything and that context is changing. 
Adapting to this new situation requires a pragmatic approach.  If PES schemes 
are intended to be pro-rural-poor, then it is necessary to depart from the economic 
tenets of PES. That means compromising by-the-book theory so as to safeguard the 
interests of those rural poor who cannot properly participate in PES unless the 
schemes are tailored to their particular circumstances.  This is the challenge. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 See Appendix I for an overview of IFAD-supported projects with PES components. 
 8
3. Main challenges 
 
“Much hope exists that poor ES providers (e.g. remote upland farmers) can raise 
their incomes by receiving PES from the allegedly richer ES buyers (e.g. urban 
water users); indeed some donors are only interested in PES for their hoped-for, 
pro-poor effects.” 
(Wunder, 2005, p.16) 
 
3.1 PES and watershed functions: Theory and implementation 
issues 
“Payments for watershed services should not be considered as a poverty 
eradication tool with widespread applicability in developing nations.” 
                   (Bond, 2007, p.1) 
  
The five principle kinds of environmental services catered for by PES are: 
1. Biodiversity functions (biodiversity corridors, preservation areas) 
2. Carbon sequestration (preserving forests, planting trees) 
3. Landscape beauty (eco-tourism) 
4. Watershed functions 
5. Bundled 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Bundled
Watershed Functions
Landscape Beauty
Carbon Sequestration
Biodiversity Functions
Number of Emerging PES Schemes
 
Figure 4: Approximate Number of Emerging PES Schemes Globally 
Source: adapted from Porras (2007) 
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Watershed functions PES schemes are not, by definition, pro-poor.  They are 
not intended for this purpose, they are intended to secure watershed functions such as 
downstream water supplies. If they are to be made to fit into a poverty-reduction box, 
they must be tailored to fit this role.  As discussed above, the ideal of PES is to link 
those who value ecosystem services with those who can provide them in such a way 
that a market is created.  In the context of underdeveloped countries, the rural poor 
may not be the best vehicle to achieve this end. 
3.1.1 The complexity of watershed functions 
PES for watershed functions seek to link upstream land use and management 
with downstream water use and management to realize benefits for upstream and 
downstream participants in the scheme as well as others in the area – not to mention 
the environment (see Figure 1).  The ideal is a voluntary agreement between at least 
one buyer and one seller of ecosystem services (or land use changes presumed to 
provide an ecosystem service).   In economic terms, this may be accomplished by 
linking upstream willingness to accept payment for land use/management change (e.g. 
not logging the forest, closing or relocating pig farms, using less water for irrigation) 
with downstream willingness to pay for improved water quality, or supply, or flow 
control (flood mitigation).  Often, upstream land users and downstream water users 
find themselves in conflict over water resources.  PES schemes can help resolve 
conflicts by facilitating the upstream-downstream flow of information and payments 
(FAO, 2004) that may clarify the allocation of resources.   
PES arrangements are complicated and this complexity is increased by taking 
on a poverty-reduction role.  Figure 5 illustrates some of the complexity inherent in 
participation in a PES scheme at the household level.  Clearly, security of land tenure 
is central to the ability of upstream land users to participate.  Ensuring a long-term 
commitment from downstream water users, the recipients of the service, is likewise 
crucial - since upstream users may significantly alter their land and water 
management practices. 
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Figure 5: Factors that affect household participation in PES programs 
Source: (Pagiola et al., 2005, p.243) 
  
3.1.2 The danger of oversimplification  
PES schemes are risky for both buyers and sellers.  In many schemes that have 
been implemented, intended beneficiaries have been expected to alter their livelihood 
strategies and their sources of income without any guarantee that the PES scheme will 
work as predicted.  In the case of watershed services PES:  “The high variability of 
geographical and climatic conditions in watersheds especially makes it difficult to 
attain generalizations about land use and its impact on water resources which are 
universally applicable” (FAO, 2004, p.7).   
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If a scheme claims to alleviate poverty, then if nothing else it is crucial to 
ensure that the poor do not become worse off as a result of its implementation.  One 
way of doing this – of taking account of the uncertainty of outcomes - is to 
compensate participants for practice and not just results, since the former may not 
yield the latter (Pfaff et al., 2007).  Pragmatically, this is also much easier to do since 
it is easier to measure compliance with practice than to quantify the results, certainly 
in the short term. However, this still assumes that it has been demonstrated that the 
practice is likely to yield the results claimed.  
3.1.3 Perverse incentives and collateral damage 
A PES scheme arrangement is essentially voluntary. Participants are still free 
to degrade the environment elsewhere, outside of the PES scheme, if they choose.  
Leakage occurs when land users displace environmental damage to another area (e.g. 
I won’t log this area, because of the PES scheme, but I will log another area outside 
the scheme). The problem of leakage illustrates how PES schemes can create perverse 
incentives, for instance when people initially outside a PES scheme now have 
incentive to degrade their environment so that they may be compensated for not doing 
so.  Indeed, “indirect effects [of PES schemes] on agricultural wages and food prices 
might adversely affect poor labourers and consumers” (FAO, 2007, p.9). 
It is possible that PES schemes can also crowd out desirable behavior because 
people feel that if they change their behavior the perception will be that it was in 
response to payments, rather than as voluntary act of goodwill. Another potential 
problem can arise when PES schemes require the cessation of labor-intensive 
activities and the resulting unemployment causes more leakage as people search for 
alternative income generating opportunities in environmentally destructive ways 
(Wunder, 2007).   
3.1.4 Supply and demand issues 
FAO argues that “since they are based on market instruments, PES schemes 
must be based on the actual supply and demand for the services in question. If the 
system is politically imposed, there is a risk of being inefficient in allocating 
resources” (FAO, 2004, p.10).  However, this need not be the case if the goal is 
poverty alleviation, not market creation.  
In any case, locating a good buyer and ensuring that service-providers have 
the capacity to participate are both crucial starting points since a scheme will require 
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an appropriate balance between supply and demand. Commonly, there are duel 
problems of a (1) lack of knowledge and capacity on the side of land users in the 
catchment with respect to land management practices, that will actually deliver a good 
water-management service and (2) a lack of demand for such services (Wunder, 2007, 
Wunder, 2005).  
3.1.5 Land tenure 
Lack of secure land tenure is one of the most significant barriers to the 
participation of the rural poor in PES schemes.  In many cases, only those who can 
demonstrate formal, legal ties to the land in question can participate as service 
providers. Yet, in some cases, even formal/legal land tenure may not translate to 
actual access to the land/resources in question (Ravnborg et al., 2007, Wunder, 2005).  
This issue is examined in detail below. 
3.1.6 Transaction costs 
High transaction costs and running costs in PES schemes makes market 
creation all the more difficult.  According to (Gutman, 2003, p.36): “Transaction costs 
associated with establishing and running market mechanisms are high (seeking, 
negotiating, agreeing, implementing, monitoring, and certifying deals). These 
transaction costs will be higher the greater the number of buyers and sellers involved 
(as in the case of a watershed where a number of individuals live).  Poor households 
with small plots will tend to face high coordination costs as part of any deal.”   
It is usually necessary to have an independent “middle man” in place to ensure 
the fair transfer of payment between upstream and downstream users (Miranda et al., 
2003) which in turn adds to the costs.  However, transaction costs need not always be 
excessive, especially if a scheme is established without an intermediary for payment 
transfer - which is feasible depending on the specific conditions (Dent 2008).  
Moreover, with respect to pro-rural-poor PES, donors and governments might decide 
to subsidize the transaction costs if the net benefits (e.g. improved environmental 
services, conflict resolution, and diversification of livelihoods) are seen to outweigh 
these costs. 
3.1.7 Monitoring, evaluation and payment transfer 
An important caveat to PES, especially for watershed functions schemes set up 
under the auspices of poverty alleviation, is that they should be properly monitored 
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and evaluated.  Establishing that the changes of management practice are actually 
providing the ecosystem services paid for by the downstream users is critical but often 
problematic.  It is problematic not only because it is difficult to scientifically 
demonstrate that land use changes yield expected water quality/quantity changes, but 
also because downstream buyers may sometimes view payments to service providers 
as something of a tax, rather than as a payment for a specific service rendered; 
therefore, they may not even request monitoring or “proof” that a scheme is actually 
functioning as planned (Quintero, 2008).  In any event, it is important to note that a 
scheme’s evaluator must be independent of the scheme to be trusted by both parties.   
 
3.2 Lessons from Latin America  
3.2.1 Legal, institutional and political support for PES 
Costa Rica provides several examples of PES in action and an exceptional 
example of government support for PES.  The 1996 Costa Rican New Forestry Act 
put PES into law and explicitly mentioned biodiversity functions, carbon 
sequestration, landscape beautification, and watershed functions.  In a deliberate 
effort to move away from direct subsidies, Costa Rica employed biodiversity function 
and carbon sequestration schemes for the global market and watershed function 
schemes for its domestic market (Chomitz et al., 1999).   
While these schemes are in operation, they have not yet reached the point of 
market creation.  Interestingly, Pfaff et al. (2007) found no significant effect (negative 
or positive ) of including the poor in such schemes indicating that, at least for the time 
being, the schemes may not be pro-poor, but at the same time they do not seem to 
harming the poor. 
  
3.2.2 Land tenure and the rural poor  
The rural poor rarely have unclouded, formal land tenure and yet this is 
usually seen as a prerequisite for PES service providers. Hope et al. (2005) showed in 
Costa Rica that the poor were unwilling to participate in a proposed PES scheme, 
almost regardless of the level of payments offered, since they did not have secure land 
tenure and did not trust the government to fulfill its promises.   
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 While PES schemes can be a catalyst to establish formal property rights for 
the rural poor (FAO, 2004) some would-be participants will be motivated to enter into 
a contractual arrangement under a PES scheme solely to acquire formal land tenure 
and may not remain involved once the have it.  This is the old problem of elite 
capture:  “Increased land values following the implementation of PES programmes 
could create greater competition for lands to which the poor have, at best, only an 
informal right of access, with a resultant loss of control to more powerful interests” 
(FAO, 2007, p.9). 
An example of PES in action in Peru demonstrates that larger, more organized 
and wealthier land owners can serve as good buyers of environmental services while 
the landless living in such areas can indeed benefit from such PES schemes.  In the 
Area de Conservacion Privada Huiquilla, a small PES scheme (one of the few 
operating in Peru), an agreement was signed in 2006 between the residents of El 
Tingo village and the large landowner (the La Torre family) in conjunction with the 
Huiquilla Fund (IFAD 2007), stipulating that residents of El Tingo can use the water 
resources for limited periods for farming (securing more water than they had in the 
past) and, in return, the residents work with the Huiquilla Fund to rehabilitate forest 
resources.  The local municipality provides independent park guards for the 
conservation areas.  
This arrangement is stable because there was a large buyer with a long-term 
commitment and the transaction costs were small, and provision was made to provide 
some security of tenure to the rural poor.  
There is, indeed, good evidence that PES schemes can benefit poor, 
smallholder service providers but landless poor, who rely on environmentally 
damaging livelihoods, tend to suffer from PES schemes (Wunder, 2005). 
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4. Pro-rural-poor approaches to PES 
 
The sections below provide an outline of the approaches and considerations 
which must be taken into account when trying to make any PES scheme pro-poor. 
 
4.1 Institutional approaches 
 
 
Supportive Institutional  
Framework 
 
Unsupportive Institutional 
Framework 
Unfavourable 
Intervention 
Conditions 
Favourable 
Intervention 
Conditions 
 
 
A
B C 
D
Figure 6: Institutional contexts and context-specific strategies 
Source: (Huppert, 2008 - adapted from Huppert et al. 2001 and 2003 and Berdegué & 
Escobar,2002) 
 
Figure 6 depicts the context for IFAD interventions.  Huppert, (2008) describes 
the intricacies of each zone in detail but the figure is useful in emphasizing the need 
for a supportive institutional framework for pro-poor PES; zone A is most conducive 
to project success.  This also highlights the problem that certain countries, especially 
those labeled fragile states, cannot at present support pro-rural-poor PES..   
 
4.1.1 Land tenure is paramount - also for the poorest of the poor? 
Secure land tenure is a prerequisite of participation in a PES scheme – pro-
poor or otherwise.  The poorest of the poor are almost always landless (officially or 
not) and cannot be directly reached by PES schemes.  Provided planners are aware of 
this hurdle, it can be dealt with.3
                                                 
3 This said, given that the very poor often do not have secure land tenure or access, it will often be 
more reasonable to target the less-poor smallholders (Wunder, 2005) who do have, or can more easily 
be provided with, secure land tenure. “RUPES-I found that the most substantive and significant poverty 
reduction occurred where the project used ‘conditional tenure’ solutions in watershed protection 
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  This problem is compounded by the lack of a voice for the rural poor in legal 
and institutional decision making.  Thus, it is the responsibility of donors and partners 
to require of governments the creation of legal and institutional frameworks which 
allow the rural poor to participate.   Secure land tenure will often be incentive enough 
to encourage initial participation – ensuring that such participation is sustained may 
require the development of further incentives. Miranda (2003) stresses the need for 
secure land tenure to be established before implementing a PES scheme, not least 
because “formalization of natural resource rights is essential to give marginalized 
groups control over, and rights to returns from environmental services” (Gutman, 
2003, p.37).   
Though the rural poor tend not to have secure land tenure this does not 
preclude the use of a PES scheme to create pro-poor side-effects; demand for labor 
created by PES schemes can be targeted toward the landless, depending on the kind of 
PES scheme in question. Watershed functions PES which require changes of land use 
and/or management are good candidates. 
4.1.2 Legal support – good, but not essential 
An effective and impartial legal system will likely help ensure that would-be 
participants can enter into contractual PES arrangements with confidence.  Ideally, 
PES schemes should be formally recognized by the country’s legal and institutional 
frameworks (Ravnborg et al., 2007).  Costa Rica is arguably the best example of 
government support and legal foundation for PES and Kenya seems to be following 
suite.  Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) legislation may also provide 
a legal and institutional route for water-related PES schemes, given that water is 
economically valued under the IWRM framework (Dent and Kauffman, 2007). 
However, a legal structure which recognizes and supports PES schemes is not 
essential - not least because support only on paper is of little practical use, but also 
because such legal frameworks can inadvertently impede a PES scheme.  “In some 
cases, an excessively rigid or bureaucratic legal framework may be an obstacle for 
such a scheme by imposing ineffective prices (which do not match the actual supply 
                                                                                                                                            
areas… These agreements, with an initial five-year time frame for ‘conditionality’ and a 25-year 
contract possible in the event of a positive evaluation, are a form of rewards for environmental services, 
in as far as they specify the environmental standards to be used in the evaluation (complementing 
compliance with institutional and administrative standards)” (IFAD 2008, Annex 4).  
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and demand) or very high transaction costs due to cumbersome regulations” (FAO, 
2004, p.6)   
4.1.3 Group contracts - but on a small scale  
“[I]n order to promote the participation of the poor as ecosystem service 
providers, it is necessary to identify institutional options for moving the 
unavoidable transaction costs from dealing with many small-scale providers 
instead of few large-scale providers from the buyers to sellers. Such options 
include allowing communities, rather than only individuals, to register as service 
providers, possibly combined with support for strengthening community-level 
organization, including their legal recognition.” 
(Ravnborg et al., 2007, p.28) 
 
Transaction costs may be reduced by concentrating the number of service-
providers into groups. Groups of service providers or consumers have a more 
effective voice in negotiations than do individuals, are better able to monitor 
compliance, and can more easily accept payments or make payments (Dent and 
Kauffman, 2007).  FAO (2004, p.6) argues that “PES systems are more easily 
managed and more effective in attaining their objectives when they are restricted to 
small scales, e.g. microwatersheds. This is because transaction and administration 
costs are usually lower at the local level; there is a better information flow among 
providers and users, the service can be defined more clearly and the institutions 
involved may have a greater adaptation capacity”  
 
4.1.4 Intermediary institutions for payment transfer 
The online auction forum Ebay provides a useful analogy for understanding 
the purpose of an intermediary in a PES scheme; many buyers and sellers choose to 
use the online bank, Paypal to facilitate payment transfer because it is believed to be a 
trustworthy, independent intermediary that connects buyers and sellers who do not 
have any direct relationship. Within the context of pro-poor water functions PES, 
there will often be a need to establish a strong, independent intermediary between 
service providers and consumers  in order that water resource allocations are properly 
monitored and assessed, to assist with the resolution of disputes and, most importantly, 
in order to provide a mechanism for the regular transfer of payments (Dent and 
Kauffman, 2007).  In certain situations, this intermediary can be an existing 
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organization, such as a water utility, which will allow for the reduction of transaction 
costs.  Usually, however, it may be preferable to establish an intermediary. 
An intermediary entails a transaction cost but this need not be a bad thing if 
the goal is poverty alleviation; donors and governments can subsidize these costs.  If 
there is institutional capacity on the part of both the buyers and sellers, direct 
contracts and payments may be arranged.  However, it is very unlikely that 
beneficiaries will be in a position to take on full responsibility for these tasks and 
doubtful that there will be enough trust between buyers and sellers.  Thus, an 
intermediary may be viewed as a necessary evil, so to speak, but one which can be 
partially paid for by donors and governments. 
  
 
4.2 Technical approaches 
4.2.1 Assessing demand and identifying appropriate incentives 
Demand assessment must be a first step in setting up a PES scheme.  There 
must be sufficient demand for the service and would-be participants must have the 
capacity to provide it.   In step with assessing demand, planners can also find out 
which type of incentives (payments, rewards) are most likely to encourage and sustain 
participation of the service-providers.   
The type of incentives which are most appropriate for the local context, 
stakeholders and beneficiaries must be thoroughly investigated; often, cash payments 
may not be appropriate.  Hope et al. (2007, p.18) report in Costa Rica and India: 
“decision-makers need to evaluate carefully which incentives work for people and the 
environment. This is neither simple nor intuitive. Cash seems obvious but people 
wanted road improvements or more secure land tenure...”(Hope et al., 2007, p.18).4  
From the perspective of the buyer, this at least is not crucially important, since an 
intermediary can convert monetary payments into other types of incentives as needed. 
4.2.2 Objective, scientific monitoring 
 “The monitoring of biophysical and socio-economic variables is fundamental 
to determine a scheme’s impact and its efficiency to attain the foreseen objectives. A 
                                                 
4 A Negotiation Support Framework developed by IIED (Hope et al., 2007) also provides a useful, 
general tool, for identifying and understanding participant incentives in a PES scheme.   
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monitoring system must be an integral part of all PES schemes” (FAO, 2004, p.10).  
Planners should create, test and verify a cause-effect model which accounts for the 
key processes behind the land use and service in question.  This model, in turn, 
provides the foundation for monitoring and evaluation of service-provider inputs and 
provide some assurance to service buyers that it is worth their while to participate in 
the proposed PES scheme. Moreover, with respect to the perverse incentives 
mentioned above, “monitoring systems must be capable of detecting ‘secondary’ or 
‘unintended’ effects of the PES scheme” (FAO, 2004, p.11).   
There are other benefits from monitoring PES schemes.  International steering 
committees can be a means of project monitoring and information dissemination.  Of 
course, depending on the extent and efficiency of a given monitoring program the 
overall transaction costs may be significantly increased.  In any case “the monitoring 
system must clearly identify biophysical and socio-economic variables to be used in 
assessing the performance of the PES scheme… [and] the system uncertainties must 
be identified and incorporated into the decision-making model through the 
participation of local agents” (FAO, 2004, p.13). 
These technological approaches can also reduce costs and optimize (rather 
than maximize) participation.5  For example, with respect to watershed functions and 
PES schemes, it is not essential that the entire catchment participate in a PES scheme.  
Dent and Kaufman (2007) demonstrated that participation of only a fraction of the 
catchment is needed to achieve significant results, in this case only the critical riparian 
zone (as compared with random participation). 
Good technical ex ante assessment (e.g. using hydrographs, remote sensing, 
and allocation models) implemented instep with demand assessments can help 
identify which households and communities need to participate to try and achieve the 
desired downstream results.   
 
4.3 Investment approaches 
“Water users are the most significant current source of funding for PES schemes, 
mainly through decentralised, watershed specific schemes, but also through 
nationwide programs (as in Mexico). Water users paying for watershed 
                                                 
5 Though this is a fine line (between optimization and maximization) since in some cases it may be 
desirable to sacrifice optimization in order to include more rural poor in a given scheme, at least in the 
short term. 
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conservation through PES mechanisms are domestic water supply systems, 
hydroelectric power producers, irrigation systems, and bottlers. The potential for 
watershed payments can significantly expand with a better understanding of the 
effects of upstream land-use changes on downstream water services.” 
(WB, 2007, pp. 197-199) 
 
International donors are already the largest financial supporters of PES 
schemes6 (Figure 7).  Given the pro-poor mandate of this international interest, in 
what kind of PES scheme should they be investing?   
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%
International Donors
Private Sector
Municipal Budget Reallocation
National Budget Reallocation
Approximate Percentage of Funding for Watershed Functions PES Schemes
 
Figure 7: Funding Sources for Watershed Functions PES Schemes 
Source: adapted from Porras (2007) 
 
Generally watershed functions PES are more likely to be geared to the rural 
poor than, say,  carbon sequestration (Wunder et al., 2005, Ravnborg et al., 2007).   
Thus, “small watersheds with a downstream hydropower plant (usually most 
vulnerable to sedimentation) or domestic water suppliers (affected by contamination 
and sedimentation) are good candidates. Large basins with multiple users, where 
downstream impacts are the cumulative impact of myriad upstream uses, are poor 
candidates” (WB 2007, p. 199).  With respect to pro-rural-poor schemes, it is also 
likely that smaller scale schemes, being more easily managed and monitored, would 
be more likely to benefit the rural poor than their larger counterparts if designed to do 
so.7
 
4.3.1 Human capacity building 
With respect to poverty alleviation, investments in education and PES scheme- 
related training are crucial: “Training in marketing, negotiation, management, 
                                                 
6 Needless to say, water users themselves finance the lion’s share of PES schemes since they are the 
ones paying for the services rendered. 
7 This assertion is largely speculative and an analysis of the pro-poor effects of PES schemes of 
different scales would be warranted to better understand the issue. 
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financial accounting, contract formulation, and conflict resolution are important 
prerequisites for effective participation” (Gutman, 2003, p.38).  Education is one of 
the factors that should be considered in planning a pro-poor PES scheme; it remains a 
cornerstone of development in the context of the new rurality and the returns on 
investments in education are among the highest of any sector (Fan and Hazell, 2001, 
Fan et al., 2002).  PES schemes, as a spin-off, educate rural populations in the value 
of their natural resources; once ecosystem services are assigned an economic value 
both service providers and consumers assign a market value to these services which, 
in turn, may lead to a more efficient use of the resource (FAO, 2004).  These are 
benefits that donors and governments may deem worth paying for. 
4.3.2 Startup and running costs – the need for realism not idealism 
Pro-poor PES schemes require start-up investment to ensure that the scheme 
actually works and, in particular, to ensure that poor groups and households are able 
to, and will participate (Gutman, 2003).  Demand assessment, hydrological 
assessments, establishment of an intermediary, and a host of other tasks all cost 
money.  
If the goal is poverty reduction, then donors and participating agencies must 
be willing not only to finance start-up but, also, to face the likely need for ongoing 
subsidies. Although the theory and goal may be a self-financing scheme - “Once 
initial transaction costs have been covered for market establishment purposes, the 
local market forces should ensure the scheme’s sustainability” (FAO 2004, p.11) – 
this may not be realistic in the context of poverty reduction. 
Donors and governments may need to artificially boost demand and subsidize 
private-sector involvement.  From this starting point a scheme’s graduation to self-
sufficiency with respect to payment transfer and market creation would of course 
provide the clearest indicator of success. 
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5. Zooming in on Kenya: Green 
Water Credits 
 
“Kenya is embracing Green Water Credits 
[GWC] because it needs it. Over the last 25 years, 
most of Kenya’s cropland has lost its topsoil; over 
the same period, the population to be fed and 
clothed has doubled and economic growth has 
hugely increased he demand for power and water.  Green Water Credits offers a way 
of bridging the incentive gap between the active land and water management needed 
to providing the Kenyan people with food, water and power security and what the 
land users currently receive” (Dent, 2008). 
5.1 Green Water Credits program 
“Green Water Credits are payments for water management services by farmers 
– services that are currently unrecognized and unrewarded” (Dent and Kauffman, 
2007, p.7).  
“The long-term goal of the GWC program is to enable upstream rural people 
to better manage land and water resources in order to improve food security, water 
security and public health, and to increase vulnerability to climatic and related 
environmental risks, while at the same time improving downstream water availability 
and quality...The proof-of concept phase started in 2006 in the Tana River basin to 
demonstrate the viability and feasibility of the offer–and–demand aspects of the GWC 
concept as a sustainable environmental service mechanism; improve local resilience 
to external shocks by asset building (green water resource, stable soils, shortening the 
hunger gap, diversified rural incomes); deliver enhanced blue water resources, and 
reduce the hazards of flood and landslip downstream” (SEI, 2008). 
The program is strategically aligned with the recent reform of the Kenyan 
water sector, specifically the 2002 Water Act and Kenyan National Water Resources 
Management Plan which assign an economic value to water resources (Meijerink et al. 
2007). Water is now considered as a socio-economic good, which is a precondition 
for a water functions PES scheme. 
The key steps for implementing GWC in Kenya are: 
 23
1. “Assess land and water rights and competing claims on the water resource; 
2. Assess the water resource, its value in all its competing uses, the costs of 
mismanagement, the extent to which green water management can 
optimize the resource, and the costs of this management;8 
3. Establish a platform for negotiation between interested parties (sellers and 
buyers); ensure thart each is well informed; seek optimum allocvation; 
agree a fair price or specified water management practices; 
4. Establish a mechanism for collection and payment of credits, verification 
of claims, and settlemet of disputes. Payments may be financed by a mix 
of water users, public utilities, insurers and general taxation.” 
(ISRIC, 2008, p.7) 
 
5.2 First prerequisite: security of tenure or access for sellers  
IFAD’s clients are the rural poor. The poorest of the poor lack secure tenure or 
even access to land so they are least suited to participate in a PES scheme.  
Considering land tenure in Kenya: “the Constitution of Kenya gives the government 
power of eminent domain and police power to control access and use of land and to 
protect property rights” (Meijerink et al. 2007, p.4). Kenyan law is a complex system 
with multiple levels blending traditional and modern legal institutions for land rights. 
There are three categories of land: Government Land, Trust Land and Private Land. 
Outside areas of relatively straightforward freehold tenure, leaseholds are one of the 
best means of providing GWC participants with secure land tenure: “Leasehold 
involves the derivation of land access and use rights from a superior title for a defined 
period of time under agreed conditions including, but not limited to, the payment of 
rent.  Leasehold provides a flexible mechanism for transacting rights in land and for 
control of land use” (Meijerink et al. 2007, p.6).  However, as the Oxbow Lakes Case 
Study (IFAD 2006a) made clear, these leaseholds must be for a significant period of 
time, gender sensitivity should also be factored in, and fail-safe mechanisms need to 
be in place to avoid elite (or male) capture.   
 
                                                 
8 In the case of Green Water Credits in the Upper Tana, Kenya, project planners used a well-proven, 
rigorous, physically-based model to forecast water and soil erosion sedimentation outcomes of the 
various management practices available. 
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5.3 Second prerequisite: A good buyer 
The involvement of the private sector in pro-poor PES schemes is both 
possible and sometimes advisable.  In the case of Kenya, the hydro-electric company 
KenGen would be an ideal partner, having both a clear incentive to pay and a long-
term commitment to the scheme  and the financial resources needed (as was the case 
in Sumberjaya 9 , Indonesia under RUPES I). Assuming that the service providers 
deliver, the hydro-electric company’s need for reliable water supply and low sediment 
input to its reservoirs will ensure long-term commitment to pay.  This being the case, 
the scheme should become increasingly self-sufficient – although external financial 
subsidy and oversight will be needed until the scheme is shown to reliably stand on its 
own feet. 
 In the RUPES project in Sumberjaya, Indonesia, secure land tenure for once-
contested lands on which coffee was grown was provided to the rural poor by 
agreements with the local hydro-electric company operating downstream of the coffee 
plantations.  This would not have occurred organically; linking poor PES service-
providers to buyers requires an external party to facilitate arrangements;  RUPES 
“served as a broker in bringing the sellers and buyers together, and without RUPES it 
may be more difficult for local communities to make these linkages” (IFAD 2006b, 
para. 46).   
5.4 Third prerequisite: Effective institutions 
 “Institution-building or institution-strengthening is fundamental to 
negotiating agreements that reflect the interests of all stakeholder groups. 
Institutions can reduce transaction costs, build local capacity, and empower 
vulnerable and excluded groups.”              (Hope et al., 2007, p.18) 
 
In the GWC proof of concept, focus groups were organized to give voice to 
the land users; water user groups and other institutions tied to the sector shared their 
views with respect to existing institutional capacities (Meijerink et al. 2007).  Project 
policy is to encourage group participation, rather than individuals, and encourage 
evolution of services supplier groups in parallel with the establishment of Water 
Resources User Associations by the new Water Resources Management Authority 
                                                 
9 http://www.worldagroforestry.org/Sea/Networks/RUPES/download/SiteProfiles/RUPES-
Sumberjaya_FINAL.pdf
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(the executive agency for the 2002 Water Act)..  GWC will also take advantage of 
existing micro-finance institutions to manage payment transfers, which serves to 
reduce overall transaction costs.  
The Kenyan government has attempted to decentralize water provision and 
operation and maintenance responsibilities while providing an enabling environment 
of policy and regulation (i.e. zone A in Figure 6).  GWC has to build links with 
existing water sector institutional structures (Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8: Kenyan Water Resources Management Authority (WRMA) Structure 
Source: adapted from Meijerink et al. (2007, p.20) 
  
This is a lesson learned from, for example, the GTZ-supported Pago por Servicios 
Ambientales en Moyobamba (PES in Moyabamba) initiative in Peru in 2004.  Based 
on an earlier initiative from 1994, the scheme sought to compensate the providers of 
environmental services in the Rumiyacu-Michquiyacu and Almendra watersheds for 
improved water conservation which, in turn, was believed to contribute to higher crop 
yields.  The sustainability of payment recovery in the scheme was strengthened by 
partnership with local institutions, especially the Entidad Prestadora de Servicios De 
Saneamiento (GTZ 2006).   
5.5 Getting the incentives right 
The GWC proof-of-concept concluded that incentives must: 
? “Be substantial enough to tip the balance of costs and benefits 
? Provide short-term, on-farm economic benefits for the farmer 
? Provide reliable income over the long term (a payment that disappears after 
one year will be less attractive than long-term access to soft credit) 
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? Include training and capacity building 
? Be conditioned on performance [of the watershed managers]” not on results 
(see also page 11 of this report).  
(Meijerink et al., 2007, p.31) 
 
This builds on IFAD’s and its partners’ experience of PES –   especially with 
RUPES I. Consequently it is in line with the guidelines for making PES pro-poor.   
The GWC concept is based on direct money payment for services rendered but the 
planning team points out that other incentives such as credit, or vouchers for school 
fees or livestock might be most appropriate and more gender sensitive (Meijerink et 
al., 2007).   
The promise of GWC Kenya can be measured anecdotally by the 
government’s desire to scale it up to a national scheme. This does not testify to the 
scheme’s pro-poor impact (which will have to wait for eventual assessment), but it 
does indicate the demand for such an approach. 
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6. Discussion & conclusions 
 
“Enthusiasm for payments for watershed services is rising, despite little 
evidence of their effectiveness.” 
    (Porras and Greig-Gran, 2007) 
 
Much like IWRM, the potential of PES is certainly appealing.  However, to 
date (as far the author is aware) PES schemes have succeeded only in payment 
transfer and not in outright market creation.  In the context of pro-poor PES, even if a 
scheme were to graduate to full market creation, it is hard to see how such a scheme 
would directly benefit the poorest of the rural poor because these people often lack the 
first prerequisite of participation: secure land tenure. Moreover, the rural poor are not 
equipped to participate in a PES scheme without significant and sustained logistic, 
technical, legal and financial assistance.   
From an economic point of view, PES schemes for watershed functions are 
also essentially incapable of achieving market creation because services can only be 
traded at one scale – the watershed.  “Therefore, since not everybody can provide the 
service and there are not many beneficiaries, the transaction at the end is the result of 
an agreement and cooperation between groups rather than the result of a competition 
between supply and demand” (Quintero, 2008).   
Lastly, it appears unlikely that a pro-poor PES scheme could stand on its own 
two feet without sustained fiscal support from donors and/or governments (and 
perhaps an artificial augmentation of demand).  However, this may actually be 
desirable if the net benefits to the poor and the environment are seen to outweigh the 
costs.  In order to achieve this, however, a deviation from the tenets of ideal PES is 
necessary. 
The bottom line is that if donors and governments are willing to accept a 
compromised version of PES in order to target the rural poor, then PES schemes can 
indeed benefit them – but PES might not be the right name for such schemes.  Figure 
9 presents a generalized, theoretical framework for PES interventions with one main 
purpose: a call to realism, not idealism.   
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Figure 9: The likely poverty alleviation potential of pro-rural-poor PES 
Source: Cohen and Cleveringa (2008) 
 
At present, most PES schemes lie in quadrant III (or II).  Schemes that might 
benefit the rural poor would need to be in quadrant I.  The likely path of a pro-rural-
poor scheme after start-up is indicated by the line which starts in quadrant II, moves 
to I, passes through IV and ends in III.10 The key message is that PES schemes are not 
pro-poor, and if they are properly geared to be then they are no longer necessarily 
PES schemes at all.  The conclusion is that poverty reduction via PES is possible – 
                                                 
10 In the context of a successful scheme under the existing rubric (i.e., one that achieves market creation) 
the once poor service-providers would no longer be poor (or not for long anyways) which would incur 
the removal of the “poverty reduction” label as they moved into quadrant III.  The label could 
potentially remain, however, if the now not-so-poor service-providers were able/willing to meet the 
demand for labor with the labor of landless poor in the area.  This problem is largely academic of 
course, and in any event it would be a good “problem” to have from the perspective of donors. 
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provided it’s not by-the-book PES.  And, once achieved, by-the-book PES will not be 
pro-rural-poor.  
Assuming this pro-rural-poor framework is realistic, then the principle 
problems of making PES pro-poor become largely technical, political, legal and 
financial – at least in the short term.  In the long term, a variety of other issues 
threaten the sustainability of PES schemes. 
Brazil provides a useful lesson on the fragility of PES schemes and their 
susceptibility to contingencies.  Not so long ago, in Brazil, pollination services 
provided by bees for a certain coffee growing scheme were valued at $60,000 
annually.  In 1997, with the emergence of coffee production in Vietnam, world prices 
dropped and Brazil’s coffee sector was hard hit; farmers switched to growing 
pineapples and the pollination services became nearly valueless.  This example 
demonstrates the difficulties of valuing ecosystem services (McCauley, 2006), and of 
sustainably implementing PES schemes.  
For a PES scheme to be sustainable there needs to be a continued demand for 
the service in question and the service providers need to be able to continue to provide 
the service (see Appendix II).  While it is hard to foresee any diminution in 
downstream demands for water or the need for good soil management to regulate this 
supply, climatic and economic change are both realities and the best that can be 
engineered is avoidance of schemes that are clearly unsustainable in the short term.  
The questions raised above and the limitations of many existing PES schemes 
are relevant given the recent support for PES, often under the auspices of poverty 
alleviation, among donors such as the World Bank, IFAD, IUCN and other bilaterals. 
As this report highlights, making payments for watershed functions pro-rural-poor 
requires a lucid understanding of the local context and the willingness to adopt a 
realism-based rather than idealism-based path to avoid pitfalls, chief amongst which 
may be simple semantics. 
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Appendix I: IFAD-supported projects with PES 
components11
 
 
Countries where IFAD is Directly Supporting PES Interventions 
  
 In line with its mandate to alleviate rural poverty, IFAD’s overarching 
development strategy to do no harm requires that potentially useful approaches be 
tried-and-tested before implemented at a larger scale.  Though its grant support of 
PES approaches on a small scale, significant gains in knowledge and understanding 
have been won (Table 1). There are now four full-scale projects with large PES 
components, either implemented or in the planning stages. On the basis of IFAD’s 
experience from the RUPES I project, the following conclusions may be drawn: 
 
• “The benefits / rewards system is to the community as a whole and not just to 
the poor among them, although, as in the provision of secure land tenure to 
community forests the poor may get a greater share of the benefits.   As a rule, 
upland communities are poorer than those in the lowlands, but there are 
reasonably rich households among these communities, who are not excluded 
from the benefits; 
                                                 
11 The material presented in Appendix I is adopted from Payment for Environmental Services (PES) 
components in planned and realised IFAD grant and selected loan projects, an internal IFAD document 
prepared by Ilaria Firmian and Laura Sollazzo. 
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• Specific interventions are needed if women are not to be excluded from 
participating in community management and decision-making in connection 
with the provision of ES; and 
• With the exception of the “river care” trial at Sumberjaya, watershed payments 
have not been based on actual delivery of specific services, but have taken the 
form of general royalties.  As a result they do not provide direct incentives for 
provision of ES.  This partly relates to the fairly loose linkage between actions 
to conserve watersheds (agro-forestry, erosion control works etc.) and levels 
of ES delivered such as dry season water flows and the level of silt in river 
water (which concern hydro-power companies and other down-stream water 
users).” 
(IFAD, 2006b, para. 27) 
 
Table 1: IFAD’s Eight Pathways for Environmental Service Reward Schemes 
Pathway Poverty dimension addressed 
1 Stop negative ‘drivers’ that enhance poverty and degrade environmental services (‘RUPES’) 
Assets, Risk, Health, Indirect 
income 
2 Enhance local environmental services and resources (e.g. regular supply of clean water, access to beneficial plant and animal resources) Health, Assets 
3 Enhanced security of tenure, reduced fear of eviction or ‘take-over’ by outsiders, allowing investment in land resources; increased asset value Assets, Risk, Indirect income 
4 Enhanced trust with (local) government, increased ‘say’ in development decisions 
Empowerment, Reduced informal 
taxes (corruption) 
5 Increased access to public services (health, education, accessibility, security) Health, Education, Indirect income 
6 Payment for labour invested at a rate at least equal to opportunity cost of labour Direct income (labour based) 
7 Increased access to investment funds (micro credit or otherwise) for potentially profitable activities Indirect income 
8 Entrepreneurism in selling ‘commoditized’ environmental services Direct income (land based) 
Source: IFAD (2006). 
 
Africa 
 
KENYA - Mount Kenya East Pilot Project for Natural Resource Management 
 [project-ongoing] 
Goal: To contribute to poverty reduction through more productive, equitable and 
sustainable use of natural resources including agriculture. 
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Objectives: To reduce ongoing land degradation processes while enhancing the 
equitable and sustainable use of natural resources.   
Components: (1) Water resource management; (2) environmental conservation; (3) 
rural livelihoods; (4) community empowerment; (5) project management. 
 
KENYA - ISRIC: Green Water Credits proof of concept  
[grant-completed] 
The Programme’s objectives included: (i) demonstrating the viability and 
feasibility of the offer-and-demand aspects of the Green Water Credits concept as a 
sustainable environmental service mechanism; (ii) improving local resilience to 
external shocks by asset building and (iii) delivering downstream blue-water 
resources and protecting land and infrastructure from flood damage. 
 
KENYA - ISRIC: Green Water Credits – Pilot Operation  
[grant-ongoing*] 
The primary goal is to introduce a reward mechanism to water resource 
management. Green Water Credits increases local resilience to external shocks by 
building natural and social capital.  
*This project is examined in detail in section 5 in the main text 
 
KENYA, TANZANIA & UGANDA - ICRAF: Programme for Pro-Poor Rewards for 
Environmental Services in Africa (PRESA) [grant-ongoing] 
 The objectives are to: (i) foster the development, implementation and 
assessment of environmental service agreements in three core landscapes and four 
associate landscapes in the highlands of Eastern and Western Africa, (ii) catalyze the 
policy support and private-sector participation in environmental service agreements in 
Guinea, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania and (iii) provide proactive support to the 
dissemination and application of assessments tools among a PRESA community of 
practice, including other IFAD projects, regional and national Katoomba Group 
networks, NGOs and national organizations 
 
UGANDA - FOREST TRENDS: Building the Foundation for Pro-Poor Ecosystems 
Service Markets to Achieve Impacts to Scale in Africa [grant-completed] 
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The Project’s specific objectives included: (i) creating a knowledge center for 
information on pro-poor markets for water, carbon, and biodiversity in Africa (ii) 
building capacity for stakeholders implementing PES to rural poor communities in 
Africa; (iii) sharing lessons learned from around the world and in Africa and (iv) 
planning systematic strategy for investment in pro-poor PES in Africa. 
 
 
Asia 
 
PHILIPPINES - Second Cordillera Highland Agricultural Resource Management 
Programme [project-ongoing] 
Goal: Reduce the poverty of the rural poor, especially highland Indigenous People’s 
communities. 
Objectives: (1) Increase farm family income of the rural poor in target areas through 
sustainable agricultural development; (2) enhance the quality of life of the rural poor 
through improved land tenure security, food security and watershed conservation 
Components: (1) Community empowerment through participatory planning, M&E 
and land tilling; (2) watershed conservation and management through supporting 
reforestation and agro-forestry; (3) agribusiness and rural enterprise development; (4) 
Rural infrastructure development; (5) program coordination and management. 
 
INDONESIA & THE PHILIPPINES - ICRAF: Programme for Developing 
Mechanisms to Reward the Upland Poor of Asia for Environment Services they 
Provide (Phase I)- RUPES [grant-completed] 
This grant provided funding to: build on, refine and adapt working models or 
best practices of successful environmental transfer payments adapted for the Asian 
context; (ii) conduct focused action-research in at least six sites to define 
methodologies with beneficiaries for best practice in transfer mechanisms; and (iii) 
Demonstrate how benefits can best be captured. 
[RUPES II will be implemented in the near future, and will have a stronger focus on 
PES schemes for carbon sequestration based on the results of the Bali 2007 meetings] 
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Latin America 
 
MEXICO - Sustainable Development Project for Rural and Indigenous Communities 
of the Semi-Arid North-West [project-ongoing] 
Goal: Reduce poverty and marginalization of communities of rural indigenous and 
non-indigenous poor in the states of Baja California, Chihuahua, Coahuila and Sonora. 
Objectives: Empower communities and organizations in the project area to develop 
the capacity to participate in local social and economic development processes, 
expand their productive and employment opportunities, and increase their incomes, 
while enhancing the sustainability of natural resource use. 
Components: (1) Rehabilitation and conservation of natural resources; (2) 
strengthening of local development capability; (3) development of rural and nature-
based tourism micro-enterprises; (4) institutional strengthening. 
 
EL SALVADOR - Rural Development and Modernization Project for the Central and 
Paracentral Region [project-ongoing] 
Goal: Reduce levels of poverty and extreme poverty among the rural populations in 
communities and municipalities of the Central and Paracentral Region. 
Objectives: Empower the rural poor in the Central and Paracentral Region to build 
their social capital and increase their production, employment and income, while 
rehabilitating and managing natural resources efficiently/sustainably, in the context of 
consolidated rural development implementation structures. 
Components: (1) Human and social capital development; (2) sustainable production 
and the rehabilitation and management of natural resources; (3) business and rural 
micro-enterprise development; (4) rural financial services; (5) project coordination 
and institutional strengthening for rural development. 
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Appendix II: Guidelines for “Pro-Poor” Payments for 
Environmental Services 
 
Stefano Pagiola12
Environment Department, World Bank 
April 2007 
 
Payments for Environmental Services (PES) is an innovative market-based mechanism based 
on the twin principles that those who benefit from environmental services should pay for their 
pro-vision, and that those who provide environmental services should be compensated for 
doing so. The PES approach is attractive in that  
? It generates new financing, which would not otherwise be available for conservation;  
? It is likely to be sustainable, as it depends on the mutual self-interest of service users and 
providers and not on the whims of government or donor funding;  
? It is likely to be efficient, in that it conserves services whose benefits exceed the cost of 
providing them, and does not conserve services when the opposite is true.  
 
A perception that areas of high poverty are highly correlated spatially with areas that provide 
environmental services has led to an expectation has arisen that PES programs could 
contribute to poverty reduction. Two aspects of PES programs are particularly noteworthy 
from the perspective of its potential impact on poverty.  
? Payments made under PES programs are usually payments to land users. This makes the 
distribution and ownership patterns of land critical for the poverty impact of PES 
programs.  
? Land user participation in PES programs is voluntary, and participants receive payments 
for doing so. This creates a prima facie presumption that participants are at least no worse 
off than they would be without the PES program. Were this not the case, they could 
simply decline to participate.  
 
PES is not designed to be a poverty reduction mechanism. The objective of PES programs 
is to address environmental and natural resource management problems, by providing a 
mechanism to internalize externalities. Attempting to focus PES on poverty reduction 
objectives has a high risk of being counterproductive, undermining the basis for the quid-pro-
quo deal between service users and service providers. If service users do not receive the 
services they are paying for, they will cease paying into the system, and then neither 
environmental nor poverty reduction objectives will be reached.  
? Poverty cannot be used as a criterion for participation. The fundamental criterion for 
participation must be the capacity to provide the desired services.  
 
Pro-poor PES. PES programs can affect the poor in a variety of ways—in particular, by 
providing an additional income source. Although PES programs should not be used primarily 
as poverty reduction mechanisms, there is considerable scope to design them so as to 
maximize their potential positive impact on the poor, and minimize potential negative impacts.  
? A pro-poor PES program is one that maximizes its potential positive impact and 
minimizes its potential negative impact on the poor.  
 
                                                 
12 These guidelines are by Stefano Pagiola (WB) and are taken verbatim from: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEEI/214574-1112740068165/21408120/ProPoorPES-2col.pdf
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Transaction costs. High transaction costs are a major potential obstacle to participation by 
the poor in PES programs. The higher the transaction costs of each contract, the less attractive 
contracts with smallholders will be for the program, as these costs will be spread over a small 
area. Similarly, the higher the transaction costs imposed on participants, the less attractive 
participation will be to smallholders.  
? Keep transaction costs low. This is important in all PES programs, as it affects their 
efficiency. Keeping transaction costs low is particularly important when many potential 
participants are poor, as they will be relatively more heavily affected.  
? Devise specific mechanisms to counter high transaction costs. When many potential 
participants are smallholders, transaction costs will inherently be high. Specific 
mechanisms should be developed to reduce these costs, such as collective contracting.  
  
Obstacles to participation. A variety of problems specific to poorer households may 
impede their participation in PES programs. They may lack the technical capacity to 
implement the required land use practices, be unable to bear the upfront costs of 
implementing land use practices that require substantial initial investments, or not 
have access to the necessary inputs. Evidence suggests that such problems are not 
always as binding as is assumed ex ante. Nevertheless, they may well be significant in 
some cases.  
? Provide targeted assistance to overcome problems that impede the participation of 
poorer households. This may take the form of technical assistance or credit 
programs, for example.  
 
Land tenure. Land tenure issues are often particularly salient for the poor. PES 
programs do not generally require land titles, but they do require reasonably secure 
land tenure. Where tenure is particularly insecure, it may be impossible to implement 
a PES program. Indeed, attempting to do so may be counterproductive, as it may 
attract additional settlers and/or result in more powerful groups displacing poorer, less 
powerful house-holds. Solving tenure problems, however, is usually beyond the 
purview of PES programs. Where other efforts are underway to address tenure 
problems, the PES program can attempt to coordinate these efforts in its target areas.  
? Avoid implementing PES programs in areas with conflicts over land tenure.  
 
Indirect impacts. PES programs can also affect non-participants indirectly. Two such 
potential impacts may particularly affect the poor:  
? Agricultural laborers. The land use practices supported by a PES program might 
be either more or less labor-intensive than the practices they replace. If they are 
less labor intensive, as for example when intensive agricultural uses are replaced 
with forest, demand for labor will fall and people who derive their livelihood 
primarily from agricultural employment may be harmed.  
? Renters. When a significant part of the area that provides environmental services 
is operated under rental contracts, the introduction of a PES program might affect 
the arrangements. Land-lords may decide to stop renting their land, for example, 
and operate it themselves under eligible land uses. There may also be conflicts 
over how to share the costs and benefits of participating in a PES program 
between landlords and renters.  
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Neither of these situations has general solutions, as much will depend on the specific 
details of the case.  
? Ensure that the social context is well under-stood, so that possible adverse impacts 
are anticipated and appropriate remedial measures can be designed.  
 
Who pays for poverty reduction? Adapting PES programs to make them pro-poor may 
well increase the cost of the program. The question then arises as to who should pay 
for these additional costs. In general, PES programs should be financed by the service 
users, and they lose their efficiency and sustainability benefits if they are not. This 
only applies to the cost of generating the desired environmental services, however. 
Service users have a vested interest in paying for service provision, which is what 
makes PES efficient and sustainable. They do not usually have an equivalent interest 
in reducing poverty. Asking them to pay the additional costs of making the PES 
program more pro-poor may make the program less attractive to them; it would be 
equivalent to taxing them for their conservation efforts. Whenever the additional costs 
of making a PES program more pro-poor are significant, therefore, other funding 
sources should be identified to cover them. Donor funding could be used to finance 
these additional costs.  
––––––––––––––––––––  
These guidelines are based in part on studies financed by a grant from the Norwegian 
Trust Fund for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development. The opinions 
expressed are the authors’ own and do not necessarily represent those of the World 
Bank Group or the Government of Norway.  
For more details on the design and implementation of PES programs, see:  
Pagiola, S., and G. Platais. 2007. Payments for Environmental Services: From Theory 
to Practice. Washington: World Bank.  
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